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ABSTRACT
Controversies around race and machine learning have sparked de-
bate among computer scientists over how to design machine learn-
ing systems that guarantee fairness. These debates rarely engage
with how racial identity is embedded in our social experience, mak-
ing for sociological and psychological complexity. This complex-
ity challenges the paradigm of considering fairness to be a formal
property of supervised learning with respect to protected personal
attributes. Racial identity is not simply a personal subjective qual-
ity. For people labeled “Black” it is an ascribed political category
that has consequences for social differentiation embedded in sys-
temic patterns of social inequality achieved through both social
and spatial segregation. In the United States, racial classification
can best be understood as a system of inherently unequal status
categories that places whites as the most privileged category while
signifying the Negro/black category as stigmatized. Social stigma
is reinforced through the unequal distribution of societal rewards
and goods along racial lines that is reinforced by state, corporate,
and civic institutions and practices. This creates a dilemma for so-
ciety and designers: be blind to racial group disparities and thereby
reify racialized social inequality by no longer measuring systemic
inequality, or be conscious of racial categories in a way that itself
reifies race.We propose a third option. By preceding group fairness
interventions with unsupervised learning to dynamically detect
patterns of segregation, machine learning systems canmitigate the
root cause of social disparities, social segregation and stratification,
without further anchoring status categories of disadvantage.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics → Race and ethnicity; Sys-
tems analysis and design; • Applied computing → Sociology;
• Computing methodologies → Dimensionality reduction and
manifold learning;
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A growing community of researchers and practitioners now stud-
ies fairness in applications of machine learning in such sensitive
areas as credit reporting, employment, education, criminal justice,
and advertising. This scholarship has beenmotivated by pragmatic
concerns aboutmachine-learning-produced group biases and com-
pliance with nondiscrimination law, as well as a general concern
about social fairness. While many of the controversies that have
inspired this research have been about discriminatory impact on
particular groups, such as Blacks or women, computer scientists
have tended to treat group fairness abstractly, in terms of generic
protected classes, rather than in terms of specific status groups.
This leads analysts to treat ranked racial and gender status cate-
gories simply as nominal categories of personal identity (a char-
acteristic of the individual) in computational analysis, rather than
understanding that male/female or Negro (black)/white are each
systems of hierarchical social statuses.
The typical literature in this field addresses problems in a super-
vised machine learning paradigm, wherein a predictor is trained
on a set of personal data X . One or more features or columns of
the personal data, A, are protected demographic categories. Each
person is labeled with the desired outcome value Y , and a classi-
fier or predictor Yˆ is trained on the labeled data set. The data is
assumed to be accurate. Fairness is then defined as a formal prop-
erty of the predictor or prediction algorithm, defined in terms of
the training data. Several different formal definitions of fairness
have been proposed, and their relationships with each other are
well studied. Some proposed definitions of fairness are [31]:
Definition 0.1 (Fairness through unawareness (FTU)). An algo-
rithm is fair so long as protected attributes A are not explicitly
used in the decision-making.
Definition 0.2 (Demographic parity (DP)). A predictor Yˆ satisfies
demographic parity if P(Yˆ |A = 0) = P(Yˆ |A = 1)
Definition 0.3 (Equality of Opportunity (EO)). A predictor Yˆ sat-
isfies equality of opportunity if if P(Yˆ = 1|A = 0,Y = 1) = P(Yˆ =
1|A = 1,Y = 1)
Comparatively little attention is given to how the protected class
labels, A, are assigned, why they are being protected and by whom,
and what that means for the normative presumptions typical of
“fair” machine learning design. This paper addresses these ques-
tions with focus on the particular but also paradigmatic case in
which the protected class is a specific racial category–African-American
(Black). We argue, using this case, that rather than being an ab-
stract, nominal category, race classification is embedded in state
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institutions, and reinforced in civil society in ways that are rele-
vant to the design of machine learning systems. Research demon-
strates that race categories have been socially constructed as un-
equal categories in numerous Latin American nations and in the
United States. Race provokes discussions of fairness because racial
classification signifies social, economic, and political inequities an-
chored in state, and civic institutional practices.
Racial categories are also unstable social constructions as a brief
history of race since late nineteenth-century America will reveal.
We will show how race categories have been subject to constant
political contestation in meaning and as a consequence racial iden-
tity itself is in fact not stable. Race is ascribed onto individual bod-
ies at different times and places in society based on many variables
including specific ocular-corporeal characteristics, social class, per-
ceived ancestral origins, and state policy [35, 45].
As a consequence of the social and historical facts about racial
classification, many machine learning applications that perform
statistical profiling, and especially those that use racial statistics,
are both technically and politically problematic. Because race is
not an inherent property of a person but a ‘social fact’ about their
political place and social location in society, racial statistics do not
reflect a stable ‘ground truth’. Moreover, racial statistics by their
very nature mark a status inequality, a way of sorting people’s life
chances, and so are by necessity correlated with social outcomes.
There is nothing fair about racial categories. Scholars of “fairness
in machine learning” using racial categories should be reflexive
about this paradox.
The social facts about race present a dilemma for system de-
signers. Systems that learn from broad population data sets with-
out considering racial categories will reflect the systemic racial in-
equality of society. Through their effects on resource allocation,
these systems will reify these categories by disparately impacting
racially identified groups. On the other hand, systems that explic-
itly take racial classification into account must rely on individual
identification and/or social ascription of racial categories that are
by definition unequal. Even when these classifications are used in
a “fair” way, they reify the categories themselves.
We present a third option as a potential solution to this dilemma.
The history of racial formation shows that the social fact of racial
categorization is reinforced through policies and practices of seg-
regation and stratification in housing, education, employment, and
civic life. Racial categories are ascribed onto individual bodies; those
bodies are then sorted socially and in space; the segregated bodies
are then subject to disparate opportunities and outcomes; these
unequal social groups then become the empirical basis for racial
categorization. It is this vicious cycle that is the mechanism of sys-
temic inequality. Rather than considering “fairness” to be a formal
property of a specific machine-learnt system, we propose that sys-
tems can be designed with the objective of combating this cycle di-
rectly and without reference to racial category. Systems designed
with the objective of integration of different kinds of bodies can
discover segregated groups in an unsupervised way before using
fairness modifiers.
Section 1 outlines two controversies about race and machine
learning that havemotivated research in this area.We present these
cases so that in subsequent sections we can refer to them to illus-
trate our theoretical claims.
Section 2 traces the history of race in the United States from
its roots in institutional slavery and scientific racism through to
changing demographic patterns today. This history reveals how
race has always primarily been a system for stigmatization which
has only recently become the site of ongoing political contest. The
racial categories continue to reproduce inequality.
Section 3 discusses how racial categories get ascribed onto indi-
vidual bodies through identification and classification. Seeing as-
cription as an event, we identify several different causes for racial
identity, including phenotype, class, and ancestral origin.
Section 4 outlines the implications of the history and sociology
of race for system design. We provide a heuristic for analyzing the
software and data of machine learning systems for racial impact by
categorizing them as either colorblind, as explicit racial projects,
or as facilitators of users engaging in racial projects (which may
be racist, anti-racist, or neither). We argue that designers have
a dilemma: using racial statistics reifies race, perpetuating cate-
gories that are intrinsically unfair. Not using them risks the sys-
tematic failures of ‘color-blind’ analysis, unwittingly reinforcing
racial hegemony.
Section 5 offers a third alternative: to design systems to be sen-
sitive to segregation in society across dimensions of phenotype,
class, and ancestral origin detected through unsupervised learning,
We sketch techniques for empirically identifying race-like dimen-
sions of segregation in both spatial distributions and social net-
works. These dimensions can then be used to group individuals
for fairness interventions in machine learning.
1 RACE AND DATA: CONTROVERSIES AND
CONTEXT
In this section, we summarize two emblematic controversies in-
volving race and machine learning and some of the ensuing schol-
arly debate.
1.1 Recidivism prediction
One area where racial bias and automated decision-making has
been widely studied is criminal sentencing. The COMPAS recidi-
vism prediction algorithm, developed by Northpointe, was deter-
mined to have higher false positive rates for black defendants than
for white defendants [33], and charged with being racially biased,
even though explicitly racial information was not used by the pre-
dictive algorithm [1]. This analysis has been contested on a variety
of scientific grounds [20], and the methodological controversy has
launched a more general interest in fairness in statistical classifica-
tion. Studies about the statistics of fair classification have discov-
ered that there is a necessary trade-off between classifier accuracy
and group based false positive and negative rates under realistic
distributions [12, 29]. In light of the difficulties of interpreting and
applying anti-discrimination law to these cases [4], a wide vari-
ety of statistical and algorithmic solutions to the tension between
predictive performance and fairness have been proposed [11, 23].
Reconsidering the problem as one of causal inference and the pre-
dicted outcomes of intervention [28, 32], especially in light of the
purposes to which prediction and intervention are intended [3] is
a promising path forward.
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The COMPAS algorithm did not explicitly use racial informa-
tion as an input. It used other forms of personal information that
were correlated with race. The fact that the results of an algorithm
that did not take race explicitly into account were correlated with
racial classifications is an illustration of the general fact that group-
based disparate impact cannot be prevented by ignoring the group
memberships statistic; fairness must be accomplished ’through aware-
ness’ of the sensitive variable [17]. Computer scientists have re-
sponded by identifying methods for detecting the statistical prox-
ies for a sensitive attribute within a machine learnt model, and
removing the effects of those proxies from the results [14].
In this paper, we argue for a different understanding of the role
of racial categorization in the analysis of algorithms.We argue that
because of the socially constructed nature of race, racial categories
are not simple properties of individual persons, but rather are com-
plex results of social processes that are rarely captured within the
paradigm of machine learning. For example, in the analysis of the
algorithm that determined alleged racial bias, the race of defen-
dants was collected not from the prediction software, but rather
from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office: “To determine race, we
used the race classifications used by the Broward County Sheriff’s
Office, which identifies defendants as black, white, Hispanic, Asian
and Native American. In 343 cases, the race was marked as Other.”
[33] A focus on the potential biases of the recidivism prediction
algorithm has largely ignored the question of how the Broward
County Sheriff’s Office developed its racial statistics about defen-
dants.We argue that rather than taking racial statistics like these at
face value, the process that generates them and the process through
which they are interpreted should be analyzed with the same rigor
and skepticism as the recidivism prediction algorithm. Themati-
cally, we argue that racial bias is far more likely to come from hu-
man judgments in data generation and interpretation than from an
algorithmic model, and that this has broad implications for fairness
in machine learning.
1.2 Ethnic affinity detection
Facebook introduced a feature to its advertising platform that al-
lowed the targeting of people in the United States based on racial
distinctions, which the company called “ethnic affinity”: African
American, Hispanic, or Asian American [27]. ProPublica discov-
ered that this feature could be used to racially discriminate when
advertising for housing, which is illegal under the Fair HousingAct
of 1968 [2]. The report stated that Facebook provided realtors with
ad-targeting options that allowed them to “narrow” their ads to
exclude non-white groups like Blacks, Asian, and Hispanics. Face-
book in fact drew the attention of the Department of Urban De-
velopment (HUD) Secretary, Ben Carson who ordered an investi-
gation of Facebook’s compliance with fair housing law. Facebook
decided to pull the feature while also increasing its certification of
advertiser’s nondiscriminatory practices [18].
During the controversy, Facebook representatives explicitlymade
the point that “multicultural affinity” was not the same thing as
race. It was not, for example, based on a user’s self-identification
with a race; Facebook does not collect racial identity information
directly. Rather, “multicultural affinity” was based on data about
users’ activity, such as the pages and posts they engaged with on
the platform.
Indeed, the fact that racial groups could be profiled by race de-
spite not having users’ individual racial identity data suggest that
race is much more than a characteristic of individual identity, but
rather is a socially reproduced form of categorical difference. The
feature did in fact give advertisers a tool to intentionally or unin-
tentionally engage in “disparate racial treatment”. However, pulling
the feature did not make discrimination using Facebook’s platform
impossible. Speicher et al. [50] have investigated Facebook’s ad-
vertising platforms and discovered that even without the feature,
there are ways to use the platform to discriminate intentionally
and unintentionally, and propose that discrimination should be
measured by its effects, or its “disparate impact” [4, 19].
Related work has been done on Google’s advertising platform.
Discriminating ads have been delivered based on racialized search
results [51] and gendered user profiles [15]. Studies about user per-
ception [43] and legal liability [13] have explored these issues in
depth. Noble [40] argues that digital media monopolies like Google
have engaged in “algorithmic oppression” that privilege white peo-
ple and has led to both the “commercial co-optation” of black racial
identities as well as a kind of digital redlining against racial minori-
ties and women, especially Asian, Black, and Latino women. But
the question remains: is this algorithmic oppression simply the re-
sult of a white-dominated industry believing that it was truly color
blind, leading it to ultimately ignore how race inequality might be
reproduced digitally and algorithmically, or are these instances of
algorithmic and digital racism systemic because searches and algo-
rithms mirror the racial beliefs of users?
2 THE POLITICAL ORIGIN OF RACIAL
CATEGORIES
Race is a social and cultural hierarchical system of categories that
stigmatizes differences in human bodies, but is not those body dif-
ferences themselves [41]. Race differences are created by ascrib-
ing race classifications onto formerly racially unspecified individ-
uals and linking them to stereotyped and stigmatized beliefs about
non-white groups [41]. We use Link and Phelan [34]’s definition of
stigma as “the co-occurrence of labeling, stereotyping, separation
(segregation), status debasement, and discrimination”. For stigmati-
zation to occur, power must be exercised [34]. Somebody is racially
white not just because they have less melanin in their skin, but be-
cause of the way society has defined the societal rules for deter-
mining racial membership and social status.
Folk conceptions of racial difference emerged in western soci-
eties during the fifteenth century, but took on scientific legitimacy
during 17th and 18th centuries. Lamarkian notions of natural and
historic races gave way to a more modern conception of race that
emphasized the immutability of the Blumenbach-inspired color-
coded racial groupings withwhichmost of us have become familiar-
White, Black, Red, Yellow. Eighteenth century notions that linked
racial differences to environment and national origin gave way to
a more static conceptualizations of racial difference now rooted bi-
ological deterministic arguments (rooted in appearance) and Dar-
winism [22, 24].
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Then ideologically supported by what is now debunked scien-
tific theory, the white racial category has been nominally defined
since the first U.S. Census in 1790 named six demographic cate-
gories: FreeWhite males of 16 years and upward; FreeWhite males
under 16 years; Free White females; All other free persons; Slaves.
Known as “The Naturalization Act” on March 26, 1790, the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
enacted “An act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,”
and extended the possibility of citizenship to “any Alien being a
free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and
under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two
years” while naturalizing “the children of citizens of the United
States that may be born beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the
United States.” The Naturalization Act of 1790 insured that “Free
white persons” would remain an officially protected category for
the next 160 years.
The construction of anAsian-American social category occurred
between the 1860’s and 1960’s. The State of Nevada was first to
pass anti-Asian legislation beginning in 1861, a precursor to anti-
miscegenation laws as as well congressional legislation and judi-
cial rulings that contributed to their social isolation and social stigma-
tization [49]. In Takao Ozawa v. United States in 1922, a Japanese
man who had studied at the University of California and lived in
the United States was denied his request for citizenship because he
was “clearly of a race which is not Caucasian.” In United States v.
Bhagat Sing Thind (1923), a “high-caste Hindu, of full Indian blood,
born in Amritsar, Punjab, India” was denied citizenship because,
though Caucasian, he was not white. The Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 (known as The McCarran-Walter Act) removed
racial restrictions in Asian naturalization, while it also created an
Asian quotas system based on race rather than on nationality [52].
In the case of Negro (Black) Americans, those once categorized
by the US Census as either “Slave” or “Other free persons”, their
racial classification varied. The 1870 and 1880 Censuses recognized
mixed-race persons as “mulatto” (defined as someone who is Ne-
gro and at least one other race), while the 1890 Census added an-
other mixed category, “quadroon,” to refer to persons who were
“one-fourth black blood.” Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) established the
legality of racial segregation that was ‘separate but equal’, as well
as confirmed the quantification of race by law. And while the 1900
Census dropped all but the Negro category, the 1910 and 1920 Cen-
sus briefly brought back the mulatto category only to drop it one
final time in the 1930 Census, which finally solidified the Negro cat-
egory once and for all along the lines of the “one drop rule”, mean-
ing that a single drop of “African blood” was sufficient to make a
person “Negro.” This rule was called the hypodescent rule by an-
thropologists and the “traceable amount rule” by the US courts. “It
was policed by an array of government agencies, market practices,
and social norms and was ultimately internalized by individuals
of mixed European and African lineage” [25] In fact, the one drop
rule treated blackness as a contaminant of whiteness, thus grant-
ing rights to those deemed white and, by definition, privileged.
After World War II, the political trajectory of race in the United
States evolved. President Truman abolished discrimination based
on race, color, religion, or national origin in the armed forces with
Executive Order 9981. Scientific racism fell into disfavor among
scientists and scholars after the war as it was strongly associated
with the defeated German Nazis. A new social theory of ethnicity,
that attempted to reduce racial difference to cultural difference and
emphasized the possibility of assimilation and equality, became in-
creasingly popular. But while this accounted for the assimilation
of many new immigrant groups, real segregation and stratification
along race lines ensured that racial categories remained ingrained
in societal consciousness, including the anti-racist consciousness
that mobilized for equal rights. Racial categories that had once
been a political myth had solidified into social fact through the
mechanisms of segregation.
The Civil Rights Movement in the 50’s and 60’s lead to Brown v.
Board of Education, which ended de jure racial segregation, and the
passing of anti-discrimination laws such as the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited discrimi-
nation based on race. Thus anti-discrimination law reified the same
racial categories that had been defined as a tool for subjugation and
segregation. Census data would then track racial statistics partly
in order to enforce civil rights laws. Anti-discrimination policies
have in the years since they have passed provoked “racial reaction”
as whites have rearticulated their political interests in new ways.
Racist and anti-racist political currents have been dialectically bat-
tling over racial policy since the rise of anti-racist consciousness.
Omi and Winant [41] characterize the changes to racial cate-
gories through political contest as “racial formation”. Key to their
theory of racial formation is the “racial project”, “The co-constitutive
ways that racial meanings are translated into social structures and
become racially signified.”
Definition 2.1 (Racial project). “A racial project is simultaneously
an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities
and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources
(economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines.” [41]
Racial projects can be racist, anti-racist, or neither depending
on how they align with “structures of domination based on racial
significance and identities”. Racial categories in the 21st century
are the result of an ongoing contest of racial projects that connect
how “social structures are racially signified” and “the ways that
racial meanings are embedded in social structures”, thereby steer-
ing state policy and social practice.
These policy changes have had lasting changes on the demo-
graphics and spatial and social distribution of the population of the
United States. This has allowed racial categories to change, albeit
slowly, as each generation experiences race differently. For exam-
ple, the United States Supreme Court struck down laws banning
interracial marriage in 1967 with Loving v. Virginia. When inter-
racial parents desired for their children mixed-race identity, they
put political pressure on institutions to recognize their children as
such. In 2000, the option to mark “one or more” racial categories
was adopted by the Census in 2000.
3 CAUSES OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION AND
ASCRIPTION
Racial categories fill societal imagination and are solidified by law.
But racial categories have their effect by being ascribed to individ-
ual bodies. Because it is not an intrinsic property of persons but a
political category, the acquisition of a race by a person depends on
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several different factors, including biometric properties, socioeco-
nomic class, and ancestral geographic and national origin.
3.1 Biometric properties
Though the relationship between phenotype and race is not straight-
forward, Omi and Winant [41] argue that there is an irreducible
ocular-corporeal component to race: race is the assigning of social
meanings to these visible features of the body. Indeed, the connec-
tion between phenotype and race has been assumed in research on
fairness in machine learning. In their work on intersectional accu-
racy disparities in gender classification based on photographs of
faces, Buolamwini and Gebru [8] use the dermatologist approved
Fitzpatrick Skin Type classification system to identify faces with
lighter and darker skin. While they draw the connection between
phenotype and race, they note that racial categories are unstable
and that phenotype can vary widely within a racial or ethnic cat-
egory. Indeed, it is neither the case that race can be reduced to
phenotype, nor that phenotype can be reduced to race: there is
broad empirical evidence that shows that intraracially among peo-
ple identified as black, the lighter skinned are treated favorably by
schools and the criminal justice system compared to those with
darker skin [9, 38, 53].
Phenotype is a complex consequence of genotype, which is in
turn a consequence of biological ancestry.With commercially avail-
able genetic testing, genotype data is far more available than it has
been historically. It has also exposed the fact that many people
have ancestry that is much more “mixed”, in terms of politically
constructed racial categories, than they would have otherwise as-
sumed; this has had irregular consequences for people’s racial iden-
tification [46].
Both phenotype and genotypemay be considered biometric prop-
erties under the law, and hence these data categories would be pro-
tected in many jurisdictions. However, despite these protections,
this data is perhapsmore available than ever. Personal photographs,
which can reveal phenotype, are widely used in public or privately
collected digital user profiles.
3.2 Socioeconomic class
While racial categories have always been tied to social status and
economic class, the connection and causal relationship between
race and class has been controversial. Wilson [55] argued that in
the postwar period the rise of the black elite and middle class made
race an issue of “declining significance”, despite the continued ex-
istence of a black underclass. Omi and Winant [41] are critical of
this view, noting the fragility of the black middle class and its con-
nection to the vicissitudes of available public sector jobs. Recent
work by Chetty et al. [10] on racial effects of intergenerational
class mobility confirm that black children have lower rates of up-
ward mobility and higher rates of downward mobility compared
to white children, even when controlling for those that “grow up
in two-parent families with comparable incomes, education, and
wealth; live on the same city block; and attend the same school.”
This is due entirely to differences in outcomes for men, not women.
Massey [36] accounts for the continued stratification along racial
lines as a result of ingrained, intrinsic patterns or prejudice, which
is consistent with Bordalo et al. [6]. In the controversial work of
Genealoдy
Genotype Inheritance Nationality
Phenotype Class Cateдories
Race
Figure 1: A model of how individual biological properties
(genealogy, genotype, andphenotype) are racialized through
national political categories and associations with socioeco-
nomic class. Here inheritance refers to all forms of capital,
including economic and social, passed from parents to chil-
dren. Broadly speaking, genealogy is a strong determiner
of race, but importantly as a common cause of phenotype,
class, and nationally recognized racial categories, which are
separate components of racial classification.
Saperstein and Penner [47], racial self-identification and classifica-
tionwas found to be fluid over time in reaction to changes in social
position, as signaled by concrete events like receiving welfare or
being incarcerated. This effect has been challenged as a misinter-
pretation of measurement error [30], though similar results have
surfaced outside of the U.S., as when Hungarians of mixed descent
are more likely to identify as Roma if under economic hardship
[48].
Confounding the relationship between individual race and class
is the fact that socioeconomic class is largely inherited; in other
words, there is always some class immobility. This is acknowledged
both in economics in discussions of inherited wealth (e.g. [42]) and
more broadly in sociologywith the transfer of social capital via the
family and institutions that bring similar people together with the
function of exchange [7]. The ways that racial social and spatial
segregation lead to the “monopolistic group closure” of social ad-
vantage on racial lines is discussed in Haynes and Hernandez [26].
3.3 Ancestral national and geographic origins
The definitions of races used in the U.S. census are “rife with in-
consistencies and lack parallel construction” [41], but have nev-
ertheless become a de facto standard of racial and ethnic classifi-
cation. Blacks are defined as those with “total or partial ancestry
from any of the black racial groups of Africa”. Asian Americans are
those “which have ancestral origins in East Asia, Southeast Asia, or
South Asia”. Hispanic Americans are “descendants of people from
countries of Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula,” and is con-
sidered by the census as an ethnicity and not a race. Though phe-
notype and class may be social markers of race, beliefs about race
as a “true” intrinsic property are anchored in perceptions and facts
about personal ancestry.
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Ancestry is one of the main conduits of citizenship, which de-
termines which legal jurisdiction one is subject to. These jurisdic-
tions can influence what categories a person individually identifies
with. It is not only in the United States that racial categories are an-
chored in ancestry, even though racial categories are constructed
differently elsewhere. Loveman [35] notes that Latin American na-
tions with a history of slavery commonly use the Black racial cat-
egory, whereas those with without that history are socially more
organized around Indigeneity. Racial categorization anywhere will
depend on those categories available by legal jurisdiction; this can
be striking to those who migrate and find themselves ascribed to
something unfamiliar. (Consider a person of Latin American of Eu-
ropean ancestry who, upon moving to the United States, becomes
a Hispanic.)
4 HEURISTICS FOR ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
OF SYSTEMS
We now address how the history and social theory of race dis-
cussed above applies to the design of machine learning and other
computer systems. Responding to the provocation raised by Noble
[40], we argue that there is a substantive difference between sys-
tems that result in a controversial or unfair outcomes due to the
racial bias of their designers and those that do so because they are
reflecting a society that is organized by racial categories. Using the
concept of a “racial project” introduced in Section 2, we propose a
heuristic for detecting racism in machine learning systems.
We draw a distinction between the software used by a machine
system and its input and output data. Further, we distinguish be-
tween three categories of systems that are not mutually exclusive:
those that are themselves racial projects, those that allow their
users to engage in racial projects, and those that attempt to be
“blind” to race. Racial projects may be racist, anti-racist, or neither.
Machines that attempt to correct unfairness through explicit use
of racial classification do so at the risk of reifying racial categories
that are inherently unfair. Machine learning systems that allocate
resources in ways that are blind to race will reproduce racial in-
equality in society. We propose a new design in Section 5 that
avoids both these pitfalls.
4.1 How has the software been designed?
A first step to evaluating the racial status of a machine system is
to evaluate whether the software it uses has been designed for the
purpose of achieving a racial outcome or representation. Using the
language of Omi and Winant [41], the question is whether or not
the software has been designed as a racial project.
If software has been designed as a racial project, then it is appro-
priate to ask whether or not the racial project is racist, anti-racist,
or neither. A racial project is racist, according to Omi and Winant
[41], “if it creates or reproduces structures of domination based
on racial significance and identities,” and anti-racist if it “undo[es]
or resist[s] structures of domination based on racial significations
and identities.”
Example 4.1. In the case of Facebook’s ethnic affiliation feature,
Facebook engaged in a racial project: to discover and represent
the racial affiliations of its users. Doing so was neither a racist nor
an anti-racist project. That it passed these representations on to
(1) How has the software designed?
• “Blind” to race. (A)
• As a racial project. (B)
• Enabling users’ racial projects. (C)
(2) Are the input data racialized?
• Not explicitly. (A)
• Explicitly, by ascription. (B)
• Explicitly, by self-identification. (C)
(3) Is the system output racialized?
• Not at all. (A)
• System ascribes race. (B)
• By user interpretation. (C)
Figure 2: Heuristics for analysis and design of algorithmic
systems. Systems of type A are “blind” to race and therefore
risk learning and reproducing the racial inequality inherent
in society. Systems of type B explicitly use ascribed racial la-
bels, and so risk reifying racial categories by treating race as
an intrinsic property of a person. These systems are racial
projects, in the sense that they represent racial categories in
away that is relevant to resource allocation. Systems of type
Cmay be considered racial projects, but have the distinction
that they enable the system users to engage in their own
racial projects. Racial projects (whether in type B or type
C systems) may be racist, anti-racist, or neither, depending
on how they align with structures of domination in society.
Categories A, B, and C are not mutually exclusive; they are
distinguished here as analytic heuristics only.
the users of its advertising platform gave advertisers the ability
to engage in broad range of racial projects. These possible racial
projects included the potential for illegal racist discrimination in
housing advertising.
The criterion for system software engaging in a racial project
is that it engages racial categories through the words, concepts, or
social structures that abstractly represent racial differences. Racial
projects are efforts to change these categories in one way or an-
other. Many systems that use machine learning are also, by design,
platforms for their users’ political expression. These platforms per-
haps inevitably become fora for their users’ diversely racist, anti-
racist, and other racial projects.
We have also seen that not all institutional outcomes with dis-
parate racial impact are due to racist racial projects; even ‘color-
blind’ institutions can have disparate outcomes for groups of peo-
ple that identify with or are ascribed race based on racial categories.
Software that has not been designed with any intentional refer-
ence to race may still treat people who identify as black relatively
poorly. These systems, which correspond roughly with institutions
of racial hegemony critiqued by Omi andWinant [41], reflect a sta-
tus quo of racial inequality without engaging in it.
4.2 Are the input or output data racialized?
Beyond the mechanics of the system’s software, we can also eval-
uate a system’s input data and output. Is the input or output being
racialized? If so how?
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Input data to a machine learning system, especially if it’s per-
sonal information, may have explicit racial labels. These may be
generated from individual self-identification, institutional ascrip-
tion, or both. As discussed above, both self-identification and insti-
tutional classification are socially embedded and changeable based
on circumstance. These labels by definition place individuals within
a political schema of racial categorization. As such, it is a mistake
to consider such labels a “ground truth” about the quality of a per-
son, as opposed to a particular event at a time, place, and context.
Every instance of racial classification in input data should there-
fore, as a matter of sound machine learning practice, be annotated
with information about whomade the ascription, when, and under
what circumstance. To do otherwise risks reifying race, treating a
person’s ascribed race as an intrinsic feature, which unfairly places
them within a system of inequality [57]. It does this even if the ul-
timate use of the data is an anti-racist racial project; indeed, the
potential for racist use of this data is always available as an expo-
sure threat.
In addition, this annotation may give analysts clues as to the
political motivations of the system designers and data providers.
Political context should be seen as part of the generative process
that must be modeled to best understand data sources. For exam-
ple, the degree to which somebody has culturally assimilated, or
the degree to which a “one drop rule” of racial classification or
recognition of multi-racial identity is in effect, may be an impor-
tant factor in determining the distribution of racial labels.
We propose that as a heuristic for analyzing a system for its
racial impact, an analyst attend to whether the inputs and out-
puts of the system are racialized either (a) explicitly through the
ascription of racial categories, (b) explicitly through either the self-
identification or subjective interpretation of the user, or (c) not at
all. Those systems designed for ascription are likely to be them-
selves racial projects, in that they use racial categories by design.
Systems whose inputs allow for racial self-identification may also
be racial projects, but also crucially allow for their users to engage
in racial projects using the system based on how they represent
themselves as a member of a race.
System’s whose outputs are racialized by user interpretation
may not be racial projects themselves; however, users can engage
in racial projects based on how the system represents other peo-
ple. Because race is an ascribed category, users of a system can
ascribe race to people represented by a system based on ocular
cues, dress, and other contextual information. Especially if these
representations accord with racial stereotypes [6], there may be
the perception that the system is reproducing racial disparities. If
the outputs of a system are racialized by interpretation but not ex-
plicitly, that interpretive discourse can itself be a racial project. In
other words, the outputs of a system, such as a search engine, can
be the subject of a conversation about race and resource allocation
more generally. However, it may be an error to attribute the con-
tent of a racialized interpretation of a system to the system itself.
A thorough analysis of the system inputs, software, and outputs
is necessary to determine where racial intent or social racial cate-
gories caused the output or ascription.
Some systems whose input and output data represent people
may not be explicitly racialized at all. However, since racial cate-
gories structure inequality pervasively throughout society, these
Ascription
Formation Sortinд
Disparity
Figure 3: Schematic of vicious cycle of racial formation. Bod-
ies are ascribed into racial categories, then sorted socially
and in space based on those ascriptions. These sorted bodies
are then exposed to disparate outcomes. Racial categories
are then formed on the basis of those unequal outcomes and
their distribution across people based on phenotype, ances-
try, and class indicators. Those categories are then ascribed
to bodies, repeating the cycle.
systems will likely reproduce racial inequality anyway. The dif-
ficulty of designing a system that neither reproduces racial social
inequality nor reifies racial categories, which are inherently unfair,
motivates an alternative design discussed in the next section.
5 AN ALTERNATIVE: DESIGNING FOR
SOCIAL INTEGRATION
System designers of machine learning systems that determine re-
source allocation to people face a dilemma. They can ignore racial
inequality in society, and risk having the system learn from and
reproduce systemic social inequality due to racial categorization.
They can also use racial statistics to try to mitigate unfairness in
outcomes, but in doing so they will reify racial categorization. We
present a third option as a potential solution to this dilemma.
This proposal rests on two theoretical assumptions. First, recall
that in our outline of the formation of race, segregation and strati-
fication of populations play a key systemic role. The social fact of
racial categorization is reinforced through policies and practices of
segregation and stratification. Racial categories are ascribed onto
individual bodies; those bodies are then sorted socially and in space;
the segregated bodies are then subject to disparate opportunities
and outcomes; these unequal social groups then become the em-
pirical basis for racial categorization (see Figure 3). Rather than
consider “fairness” to be a formal property of a specific machine-
learnt system, we propose that systems can be designed to disrupt
this vicious cycle. This requires treating groups that have been seg-
regated socially and in space similarly, so that disparate impacts do
not apply.
The second assumption addresses the problem that ascribing
politically constructed racial categories reifies them, which con-
tributes to status inequalities. We ask: how can systems designed
with the objective of integration of different kinds of bodies, espe-
cially those bodies that have been sorted racially, but without ref-
erence to racial categories themselves? Our alternative design also
draws on our conclusion from Section 3. The facts about people
that cause ascription and self-identification with politically con-
structed status categories are facts about phenotype, social class
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(including events that signal social position), and ancestry. We pro-
pose that categories reflecting past racial segregation can be in-
ferred through unsupervisedmachine learning based on these facts.
These inferred categories can then be used in fairness modifiers for
other learning algorithms.
By using inferred, race-like categories that are adaptive to real
patterns of demographic segregation, this proposal aims to address
historic racial segregation without reproducing the political con-
struction of racial categories. A system designed in this way learns
based on real demographics of the populations for which they are
used, and so will not result in applying national categories in a
context where they are inappropriate. It is also adaptive to demo-
graphic changes in the same place or social network over time.
5.1 Detecting spatial segregation
Spatial segregation into different neighborhoods is one of themain
vehicles of disparate impact on people of different races. In part
because of the its long history, the question of how to best mea-
sure spatial segregation is its own subfield of quantitative sociol-
ogy [44, 54, 56] whose full breadth is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. The most basic measure, which is bothwidely used and widely
criticized, is the dissimilarity measure, D.
Definition 5.1 (Dissimilarity (Black and white)).
D =
1
2
∑
i

wi
W
−
bi
B

where i ranges over the index of spatial tracts, wi and bi are the
white and black populations in those tracts, andW and B are the
total white and black populations in all tracts.
While defined above with respect to only two racial groups, gen-
eralized versions of the metric have been proposed for multiple
groups. Most criticism of this metric is directed at the fact that it is
“aspatial”, obscuring true spatial relationship through the division
of land into parcels, which may be done in a way that invalidates
the result [44, 54, 56]. For the purposes of this article, we will as-
sume that the spatial tracts are selected adequately in order to fo-
cus on a different criticism: that this metric assumes that the popu-
lation has been ascribed to racial categories, thereby reifying them.
We propose a modification of this metric for identifying race-like
categories of segregation between land tracts.
Consider the following sketch of method of detecting spatial
segregation. Let i range over the indices of land tracts. Let j range
over the indices of individuals. Let ®xj be a vector of available per-
sonal data about each individual, including information relevant to
phenotype (perhaps derived fromphotographs), class, and national
origin. For simplicity, consider the vector to be of binary features.
Let i(j) be the index of the tract where person j resides. Let ®Xi be
the aggregation (by summation) of all xj such that i(j) = i as a
normalized vector. Let X be all ®Xi combined into a matrix.
The first principle component ofXwill be a feature vector in the
same space as the parcel data vectors ®Xi that reflects the dimension
of greatest variance between parcels. Because the parcel data vec-
tors aggregate information about the components of race (pheno-
type, class, and nationality), this would reflect racial segregation
without depending on any particular historical or political racial
categorization. Other principle components would likewise reflect
other elements of racial segregation. Persons could then be racially
classified by transforming their personal data vector through the
principle component and thresholding the result. This classifica-
tion could then be used as an input A to fairness interventions in
machine learning.
5.2 Detecting social segregation
Social segregation by race may be operationalized using network
representations of society. Homophily, the phenomenon that sim-
ilar people are more likely to be socially connected, is a robustly
studied and confirmed result [37], and the problem of bridging be-
tween isolated niches has been posed as a general social problem
beyond the context of race [16]. Several metrics for measuring so-
cial segregation of all kinds have been proposed [21] [5]. These
metrics have in common that they assume that nodes in the net-
work have already been accurately assigned to different groups.
One widely known segregation measure for discrete properties
is the assortativity coefficient [39], defined as:
Definition 5.2 (Assortativity coefficient).
r =
∑
i eii −
∑
i aibi
1 −
∑
i aibi
where ei j is the fraction of edges in the network that connect
nodes of group i to nodes of group j, ai =
∑
j ei j , and bj =
∑
i ei j .
As r approaches 1, the network gets more assortatively mixed,
meaning that edges are within group. If the groups in question
are racial classifications, an assortatively mixed network is a seg-
regated network.
To adapt to the case where racial classification is not given, but
component racial features such as phenotype, class, and nation-
ality are available as vector ®xi (again, of binary features, for sim-
plicity) consider a method similar to that proposed in Section 5.1.
For each edge between i and j, aggregate ®xi and ®xj into ®Xi j by
summing them, then combine these into a matrix X, and use the
principle components to determine the dimensions of greatest vari-
ation between the aggregated properties of each connected pair. As
before, transforming the individual feature vectors by the compo-
nents and applying a threshold then assigns each person to the
race-like groups of greatest social segregation. Measuring the as-
sortativity coefficient for these groups will provide another mea-
sure of the segregation of the population along race-like lines. These
classifications can then be used as protected groups A in fair ma-
chine learning.
5.3 Threats to validity and future work
We have proposed that as a normative goal, systems can be de-
signed to promote similar treatment of bodies that are otherwise
segregated socially or in space. This proposal is motivated by social
theory of how segregated perpetuates racial categories as a system
of status difference. We have not implemented or tested this design
and here consider threats to its validity.
An empirical threat to its validity is if the principal components
of the aggregated feature matrices do not reflect what are recogniz-
able as racial categories. This could be tested straightforwardly by
collecting both ascribed (or self-identified) racial labels and other
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features for a population and computing how well the principle
component vectors capture the ascribed racial differences. If the
categories were not matched, then it could be argued that the sys-
tem does not address racial inequality.
On the other hand, if there are ever race-like dimensions of seg-
regation that have not been politically recognized as racial cate-
gories, then that is an interesting empirical result in its own right. It
suggests, at the very least, that there are active forms of discrimina-
tion in society based on properties of people that are not currently
recognized politically. We see the discovery of potentially unrec-
ognized forms of discrimination as a benefit of this technique.
Another threat to validity of our analysis is the known fact that
the schematic “vicious cycle” of racial formation presented in Fig-
ure 3 is an over-simplification. We have drawn this theory from a
survey of sociology literature on the formation of race. However,
we now only have a hypothesis about the actual effects of such
a system designed as proposed here on the politics of race over
time. Confirming that hypothesis will require implementation and
extensive user testing, perhaps through a longitudinal study.
Our discussion of strategies and metrics for reducing segrega-
tion along race-like lines has been brief due to the scope of this
paper. We see refinement of these techniques as a task for future
work. An example open problem raised by the preceding discus-
sion is which social network segregation measures are best at cap-
turing the effects of racial inequality.
6 DISCUSSION
Controversies surrounding machine learning’s treatment of race
have inspired a growing field of research about fairness in machine
learning. This field often treats fairness as formal property of com-
putational systems, where fairness is evaluated in terms of a set of
protected groups (A, in our notation). The system is considered fair
if outcomes are in some sense balanced with respect to the groups.
Group membership is considered a simple fact about natural per-
sons.
In this paper, we have scrutinized what it means for racial iden-
tity to be a ’protected group’ in machine learning. We trace the his-
tory of racial categories in U.S. law and policy to show how racial
categories became ingrained in society through policies of segrega-
tion and exclusion. The recent manifestation of them in civil rights
law is still based on their role as political status categories ascribed
based on differences in body, class, nationality, and ancestral ori-
gin. Because they are intrinsically categories of disadvantage and
inequality, there is nothing fair about racial identity.
System designers are caught in a dilemma: ignore race and re-
produce the inequality of race by accident, or explicitly consider
racial statistics in order to mitigate inequality in favor of fairness.
Through its use of racial classification, the latter systems put them-
selves in a paradoxical position of making the unequal equal, and
invite political opposition and cooption.
We propose a third way based on the insight that racial cate-
gories are perpetuated by real patterns of segregation in space and
society. We argue that rather than promote “fairness” as a system
property, systems should be designed with the objective of pro-
moting social integration based on similar treatment of segregated
populations. To perform this function, systems need a way to de-
termine which which populations are racially segregated without
reifying existing racial categories by dependence on racial statis-
tics. We propose unsupervised learning methods for finding latent
dimensions of racial segregation in race and society. These dimen-
sions can be used to dynamically classify people into situationally
sensitive racial categories that can then be entered into fairness
computations.
Racial categories, and the disadvantage associated with them,
are solidified through segregation in housing, education, employ-
ment, and civic life, which can happen through legislation and in-
stitutional mechanisms. It is the segregation and the disparate ad-
vantages of being in segregated groups that is the cause of unfair-
ness. We are proposing that “fairness in machine learning” should
be designed to detect segregation in an unsupervisedway that does
not reify the historical categories of reification while nevertheless
being sensitive to the ongoing effects of those categories. This de-
sign is adaptive to social change, the emergence of new segregated
and discriminated-against groups, and also the emergence of new
norms of equality.
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